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Abstract. Since the value of information is constantly growing more and
more businesses are in need for information system to aid them with infor-
mation gathering and processing. The most important issue that arises here
is how to ensure safety of this data that may be held on servers, personal
computers or PDAs. This is where access control comes in. The main role
of access control is to ensure that no unauthorized user will be able to gain
access to resources and be able to copy or modify them.
The paper deals with the process of access control administration in
information systems with the use of usage role-based control approach. The
presented process is based on the role engineering concept that includes the
creation of security schema of access control divided between two actors -
application/system developer and security administrator. They realize their
tasks during two main phases that allow to define the complete access control
schema for information systems of an organization and to ensure the access
control coherence on the global level.
Keywords: access control of information systems, usage role-based access
control, role engineering, administration of access control.
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1. Introduction
Since the value of information is constantly growing more and more businesses
are in need for information system to aid them with information gathering and pro-
cessing. The most important issue that arises here is how to ensure safety of this
data that may be held on servers, personal computers or PDAs. This is where access
control comes in. The main role of access control is to ensure that no unauthorized
user will be able to gain access to resources (such as files or directories that may
hold information) and be able to copy or modify them. It ensures proper protec-
tion for information held within the information system so that no individuals or
companies will be able to steal or use it. With the fast progress of technologies
the security issue becomes the most important issue when any sensitive data is
concerned.
There are currently many models of access control that suggest rules of guard-
ing data from unwanted guests that we may choose from. Every company should
analyze their needs and choose best suitable model for their needs to ensure safety
and confidentiality of sensitive data. It is possible to use a model that ensures cen-
tral administration of who can and who can’t access system’s files, or we may leave
those decisions to the owners of files. It can be also possible to choose whether this
access rules are to be modified statically or dynamically (e.g. during program ex-
ecution). Every model has its advantages and disadvantages which is why every
company wanting to implement them must firstly attentively research each model
and study if it will fit their needs.
Development in information technology requires also the additional features
for access control domain. Data protection against improper disclosure or modi-
fication in the information system is the important issue of each security policy
realized in the institution. Access control policies, strategies or models should also
be changed to manage the new security problems.
On the other side, distributed information systems or federation of informa-
tion systems provide the access of many different users to huge amount of data,
sometimes stored in different locations and secured by different strategies, secu-
rity policies and models or inner enterprise rules. These users have different rights
to the data according to their business or security profiles that depend on their or-
ganization positions, actual locations and many other conditions. The system data
is transferred between the particular nodes of distributed system. It is important
to protect the information against non-controlled utilization and control the usage
and diffusion of the information that gives the possibility to specify how it can be
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used and specify the utilization constraints. In order to meet these requirements in
modern access control, a new access control approach, named Usage Role-based
Access Control (URBAC) was proposed. Compared to the traditional models, UR-
BAC approach assures the usage control in data accessing that is very important,
especially in distributed information systems, and the organization of the access
control strategies well-described in RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) model
[1, 2] or its extensions.
The research of roles to set up in an organization is a complex task because
very often the functions of actors in an organization are few or badly formalized.
Moreover, the role concept is an abstract approach – it does not correspond to a
particular physical reality and therefore it is very difficult to give definitions that
comprise the whole world. The research of roles needs, like many other scientific
domains, a real engineering approach that provides a guide to comprehend and
maintain them.
The paper deals with the process of access control administration in informa-
tion systems with the use of usage role-based control approach. The presented pro-
cess is based on the role engineering concept that includes the creation of security
schema of access control divided between two actors - application/system devel-
oper and security administrator. They realize their tasks during two main phases
that allow to define the complete access control schema for information systems
of an organization and to ensure the access control coherence on the global level.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the usage control con-
cept and Usage Control (UCON) model, section 3 deals with usage role-based
access control approach for dynamic, complex information systems while section
4 describes the role engineering process with the use of usage concept. Section5
presents the implementation example of usage role-based access control approach
and section 6 describes the administration tool to manage the access control in
information systems with the use of usage concept.
2. Usage control and UCON model
The traditional approach to usage control encompassed three main areas: ac-
cess control (closed-environment authorization systems that base on identity and
attributes of a known user), trust management (authorization for unknown users,
based on their properties and capability) and digital rights management (control
over the usage of resources that have already been disseminated). These three
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components were studied separately and only Usage Control (UCON) approach
encompassed all these three elements of logical security [3, 4].
Usage decision is not only based on existence of subject attributes and object
attributes. It is based on fulfillment of required actions by the users during access-
ing the data or simply during connecting with a system. It is also based on certain
environmental or system status that can be static and constant during some period
of time or can change dynamically. Such decision factors were named obligations
and conditions and represent the dynamic aspects of access control in information
systems. They represent the type of constraints that determine the possibility to al-
low an access to data basing on the factors that can change dynamically - they can
be evaluated before or during the access request. Moreover, the usage of an object
can demand some modifications in subject attributes or object attributes before an
access, during an access or even after the access.
The UCON concept can be divided taking into consideration its scope. The dis-
tinction can be done based on control domain: the system might include a Server-
Side Reference Monitor (SRM), where a central entity manages usage control (this
approach addresses primarily the issues of access control and trust management),
a Client-Side Reference Monitor (CRM), when a client-side application controls
access to resources (this approach addresses primarily the issue of DRM), or both
[5, 6].
Definition of rights in UCON model is fairly similar to that arising from the
traditional approaches: rights are privileges a subject (e.g. user) holds on a certain
object (e.g. files the user wants to access), represented by a usage function enabling
access to objects [3, 4]. The core idea of UCON model is the possibility of detect-
ing certain rights in dynamic way. Certain usage decision functions are applied to
determine the existence of a right whenever a subject wishes to access the object.
The result of these functions depends on subject’s and object’s attributes. Also,
these attributes can be altered as a result of executing a right, which then can have
an influence on future usage decisions (e.g. the user may have the possibility to
access a file five times only, or access only one file of a given type). This ensures a
fully dynamic approach to usage control [3].
The UCON model [5, 6, 7] consists of three core components, i.e. subjects,
objects, and rights, and three additional components that are mainly involved in
authorization process, i.e. authorization, conditions, and obligations. Subjects and
objects can have in addition the attributes (i.e. subject attributes and object at-
tributes) that define the additional characteristic features of subjects or objects,
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Figure 1. UCON model
which can be used in decision process of usage control. An attribute is regarded as
a variable with a value assigned to it in each system state (Fig. 1).
3. Usage role-based access control approach for dynamic,
complex information systems
Distributed information systems can contain many different components, ap-
plications, located in different places in a city, in a country or on the globe. Each of
such components can store the information, can make this information available to
other components or to different users. The authorized users accessing the infor-
mation can change this information, its status, role or other attributes at any time.
These changes can cause the necessity of modifications in security properties of
accessed data on access control level. Such modifications are dynamic and often
should be realized ad hoc because other users from other locations can request the
access to the information almost at the same time.
The proposed access control approach was based on two access control mod-
els: extended RBAC model [8] and UCON model [5, 6]. It was named Usage
Role-based Access Control (URBAC) (Fig.2).
The core part of URBAC [9] model essentially represents the extended RBAC
model. Subjects can be regarded as individual human beings. They hold and ex-
ecute indirectly certain rights on the objects. Subject permits to formalize the as-
signment of users or groups of users to the roles. Subject can be viewed as the base
type of all users and groups of users in a system. It can be presented as an abstract
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Figure 2. General view of Usage Role-based Access Control model
type, so it cannot have direct instances - each subject is either a user or a group of
users. The aggregation relation SubjectGroup that represents an ordering relation
in the set of all system subjects can assign subjects to the groups.
The Session element represents the period of time during which the user is
logged in a system and can execute its access rights. Session is assigned directly
to the Subject. On the other hand a session is connected with the roles and this
association represents the roles that can be activated during one session.
A Role is a job function or a job title within the organization with some asso-
ciated semantics regarding the authority and responsibility conferred on a mem-
ber of the role. The role can represent a competency to do a specific task, and it
can embody the authority and responsibility. The roles are created for various job
functions in an organization. The direct relation is established between roles and
subjects that represent the users or groups of users. It is also possible to define
the hierarchy of roles, represented by aggregation relation RoleHierarchy, which
represents the inheritance relations between the roles.
The association relation between roles and subjects is described by the asso-
ciation class SubjectAttributes that represents the additional subject attributes (i.e.
subject properties) as in Usage Control. Subject attributes provide additional prop-
erties, describing the subjects that can be used for the usage decision process, for
example an identity, enterprise role, credit, membership, security level. The Us-
age Control introduced two types of attributes: immutable attribute that cannot be
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changed by the user activity (only by administrative actions) and mutable attribute
that can be modified as a side effect of subjects’ access to the objects.
Each role allows the realization of specific task associated with an enterprise
process. A role can contain many functions that a user can apply. A role can be
viewed as a set of functions that this role can take to realize a specific job. It is also
possible to define the hierarchy of functions, presented by aggregation relation
named FunctionHierarchy, which represents the inheritance relations between the
functions.
Each function can perform one or more operations that this function needs to
be defined as a set of permissions. To perform an operation one has the access
to required object, so necessary permissions should be assigned to corresponding
function.
The permission determines the execution right for a particular method on the
particular object. In order to access the data, stored in an object, a message has to
be sent to this object. This message causes an execution of particular method on
this object. Very often the constraints have to be defined in assignment process of
permissions to the object.
Such constraints are represented by the authorizations and also in some cases
by the obligations and/or conditions. Authorization (A) is a logical predicate at-
tached to a permission that determines the permission validity depending on the
access rules, object attributes and subject attributes. Obligation (B) is a functional
predicate that verifies the mandatory requirements, i.e. a function that a user has to
perform before or during a usage. Conditions (C) evaluate the current environmen-
tal or system status for the usage decision concerning the permission constraint.
A constraint determines that some permission is valid only for a part of the
object instances. Therefore, the permission can be presented as a function p(o, m,
Cst) whereo is an object, m is a method which can be executed on this object and
Cst is a set of constraints which determine this permission. Taking into consider-
ation a concept of authorization, obligation and condition, the set of constraints
can take the following form Cst = {A, B, C} and the permission can be presented
as a function p(o, m, {A, B, C}). According to this, the permission is given to all
instances of the object class except the contrary specification.
The objects are the entities that can be indirectly accessed or used by the users.
The relation between objects and their permissions are additionally described by
association class ObjectAttributes that represents the additional object attributes
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(i.e. object properties) that cannot be specified in the object’s class and they can be
used for usage decision process. They can be also mutable or immutable as subject
attributes do.
The constraints can be defined for each main element of the model presented
above and also for the relationships among the elements. The concept of con-
straints is described widely in the literature [10, 8]. It is possible to distinguish
different types of constraints, static and dynamic that can be attached to different
model elements. The URBAC model distinguishes the following general types of
constraints:
• Authorizations - constraints defined for the permissions, basing on access
rules defined by enterprise security policy but also basing on objects’ at-
tributes and subjects’ attributes.
• Obligations - the subject can be associated with the obligations which repre-
sents different access control predicates that describe the mandatory require-
ments performed by a subject before (pre) or during (ongoing) the access
[11].
• Conditions - session is connected with the set of conditions that represent
the features of a system or application. They can describe the current envi-
ronmental or system status and states during the user session that are used
for the usage decision.
• Constraints on roles and on functions. The most popular type in this group
of constraints is Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints [10, 8].
• Constraints on relationships between the model elements [8, 12].
The detailed model of usage role-based access control approach is presented
on figure 3.
4. Role engineering with the use of usage concept
The aspect of role engineering in access control domain is connected close to
the aspects of analysis and design of information systems. However, it is difficult
to find the global method that takes into account both the design of information
system and its associated security scheme [13, 14].
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Figure 3. Complete structure of URBAC approach
The process of roles identification and setting up in an organization is a com-
plex task because very often the responsibilities of actors in an organization and
their functions are few or badly formalized. Moreover, the role concept is an ab-
stract approach and it does not correspond to a particular physical being. The iden-
tification and determination of roles in security schema needs real engineering
approach that provides the appropriate management of roles in security schema of
information system [14, 15].
Two types of actors cooperate in the design and realization of security schema
of an information system: on the one hand it is application/system developer who
knows its specification that should be realized and on the other hand it is security
administrator who knows the general security rules and security constraints that
should be taken into consideration on the global company level.
We propose the partition of responsibilities between these two actors in the
process of definition and implementation of security schema on access control
level and to determine their cooperation in order to establish the global access
control schema that fulfill the concepts of URBAC model. Their responsibilities
were divided into two stages: conception stage and exploitation stage (Fig.4).
The application developer realizes the conception stage on the local level of
information system. He defines the elements of the application and its constraints
corresponding to the client’s specifications. The developer generates the sets of
following elements: roles, functions, permissions and security constraints. These
sets should be presented to the security administrator in a useful and legible form.
The duties of application developer basing on URBAC model can be determined
as follows:
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Figure 4. Partition of responsibilities in role engineering process
• definition of permissions - identification of methods and objects on which
these methods can be executed,
• definition of object attributes associated to certain objects according with
access control rules,
• assignment of elements: permissions to functions and functions to roles,
• definition of security constraints associated to the elements of the applica-
tion, i.e. authorizations, obligations and conditions on the permissions and
standard constraints on roles, functions and their relationships.
The security administrator realizes the exploitation stage on the global level of
information system. He defines the administration rules and company constraints
according to global security policy and application/system rules received from the
developer. He should also check if these new security constraints remain in agree-
ment with the security constraints defined for the elements of existing information
system in order to guarantee the global coherence of the whole information system.
The duties of the security administrator are as follows:
• definition of users’ rights basing on their responsibilities and their business
functions in an organization – assignment of users to the roles of information
system,
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• organization of users in groups and definition of access control rights for
the groups of users that realize for example the same business functions –
assignment of groups to the roles,
• definition of subject (i.e. user or group of users) attributes associated to cer-
tain users or groups of users that allow to determine the dynamic aspects of
security constraints,
• definition of security constraints for the relationships between users and
roles or groups of users and roles.
UML (Unified Modeling Language) [16, 17] can be used in role engineering
process to implement and realize the URBAC model. To accomplish this, the con-
cepts of UML and URBAC model should firstly be joined. Two types of UML
diagrams have been chosen to provide the URBAC model: use case diagram and
interaction diagram. The relationships between UML concepts and concepts of
usage role-based access control model are as follows (Fig. 5):
• role (R) from access control model can be presented as an UML actor,
• function (F) from URBAC model can be represented by an UML use case,
• each actor from use case diagram can be in interaction with a set of use
cases and these relations specify the relations of R-F type (between roles
and functions),
• methods executed in sequence diagrams and also in other UML diagrams
can represent the methods of URBAC model,
• objects that occur in UML diagrams, e.g. sequence diagram, communication
diagram, can be attached to the object concept of access control model,
• permissions (P) of URBAC model can be found examining the sequence
diagram(s) describing the particular use case,
• use case diagram offers four types of relations between its elements:
– communication relation between an actor and a use case that represents
the relation between role and function, i.e. R-F relation,
– generalization relation between actors, representing the inheritance re-
lation between roles (R-R relation),
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Figure 5. Elements of URBAC model and corresponding UML concepts
– two types of relations between use cases represent the inheritance re-
lations between functions of URBAC model, i.e. F-F relations
• subject attributes (e.g. user attributes) from URBAC model can be repre-
sented by the set of attributes defined for an instance of actor class of UML,
• concept of object attributes from URBAC model can be attached to set of
attributes defined for the objects in its class specification.
The concept of constraints of the URBAC model corresponds directly to the
constraint concept existing in UML. The security constraints of URBAC model
can be defined for different elements and for relations between these elements.
These constraints can be presented on UML diagrams corresponding to types and
locations of elements for which these constraints will be defined.
The process of role production can be automatic or partially automatic and
is based on the connections between UML and URBAC model. This process is
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realized with the use of use case diagrams, where system roles and functions are
defined and with the use of sequence diagrams, where permissions are assigned
to the rights of execution of methods realized in each use case. The diagrams of
these two types should be examined to identify the roles of URBAC model, the
functions that are used by these roles to interact with the information system and
the permissions needed to realize these functions.
The process of creation of user profiles, i.e. production of set of roles, in an
information system with the use of UML diagrams contains two stages:
• determination of a set of privileges (i.e. permissions) for a use case in order
to define a function and
• determination of a set of use cases (i.e. functions) for an actor in order to
define a role.
In order to define the security profiles for the system’s users or groups of users,
the set of roles should be assigned to the subject profiles (i.e. user profiles). The
security administrator realizes this task during the exploitation stage. Security ad-
ministrator has to take into consideration the security constraints defined on the
global level and the subject attributes defined for the subjects (i.e. users or groups
of users) that determine the access control rights of particular system’s users.
5. Exemplary implementation of URBAC components
The URBAC model is an abstract model, as well as RBAC model or UCON
model, and it represents the union of role based control approach and usage control
approach in security of information systems. It contains the set of logical security
concepts that can be used in practice to define the security rules for particular in-
formation systems of enterprises. We decided to study how the URBAC model can
be useful in creation of security schema of an application of information system.
The main advantage of this model is the possibility to manage all complex and
dynamic aspects of access control in current applications or information systems.
The exemplary application was created to check how the elements and princi-
ples of URBAC model could be put into practice. This application is a web service
offering an on-line music store. It will allow customers to buy, download and up-
load music files to the system, putting a price on them, and availing the users with
a possibility to buy the credits. The service also allows browsing through the files
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on offer to find those the users wish to have. The users can have the access to dif-
ferent levels of the application’s functionality based on membership type. For this
reason, we can distinguish the following types of roles of URBAC model:
• Guests – new visitors with no account, only allowed to view the content of
the web page restricted to the home page, About page, and the list of music
files available,
• Registered users - users whose accounts have been activated, potentially eli-
gible to perform certain transactions, can have different privileges depending
on the type of membership:
– Regular users are only able to upload, buy and download files, and
have to watch advertisements upon downloading,
– Premium users do not have this limitation and additionally have access
to the transaction of trading,
• Administrator - the person that has access to all application data via a sepa-
rate administration area.
The functions of URBAC approach are represented by the functionality of ap-
plication. The basic functions contains (Fig. 6):
• registration of a new user,
• buying of first credits in order to start trading with other site members,
• adding of user’s own file to the site,
• buying of selling the tracks,
• editing or deleting of files by a user but only these files of which he/she is
the owner,
• viewing of user’s personal site with information about number of actual
credits, list of his uploaded files, list of downloaded files, accepted trans-
fers and transfers sent,
• buying of additional rights which allows user to omit the advertisements and
waiting for downloading files as well as access the trade operation.
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Figure 6. User personal site of the on-line music store
The created application includes a big amount of authorizations and condition
rules as well as a number of obligations examined whenever users wish to access
a particular file. These components work in both a static and dynamic way.
The first URBAC set of elements is subjects that are represented by users
whose properties are collected in the User model. This is an identifiee subject
type, as it represents a certain set of credentials. However, it can also represent a
provider subject if the User owns a file uploaded onto the server. The concept of
consumer rights separated from identifiee rights is not utilized, since any coopera-
tion of the application with a custom player for the files did not been provided, nor
any DRM policies did not been introduced to be imposed on the downloaded files.
The model has certain attributes, which can change as a result of executing a
certain right. For example the number of credits will be decreased when the user
buys a file. Also, the User’s group can change once the decision to upgrade to a
premium user has been made. The User also contains a field indicating whether the
most recent terms and conditions introduced have already been agreed on. This is
an example of checking global obligations before any transaction is committed.
Some attributes, however, are static, and can only be changed by means of an
administrative action (e.g. user name and the password).
The Group can also be considered as a subject, and it has its own attributes.
Those are boolean values, representing the accessibility of certain transaction, as
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well as a short value, representing the fee users have to pay to become members of
a certain group. The default groups are: guests, regular users and premium users.
However, when authorization is being checked, we do not rely on the type of the
group, but on the group’s attributes. These approach is more flexible - if need be,
the administrator may define new groups with different transactions accessible and
different membership fees. This ensures a finer-grain control over usage policies.
The MusicFile should be perceived as an object as far as the URBAC model is
concerned. It has some static attributes, such as the owner, which can be modified
only by the system administrator. In contrast, the attributes as the price, name,
artist and the number of the number of available downloads after it is bought can
be considered dynamic, since they can be modified by the owner by means of
executing modification option, which is also a transaction.
The authorization rules are defined as follows: the primary rule is to check
whether the user is not a guest. Unregistered user only has access to viewing the
list of files, without the possibility of buying or downloading them. Next, the ap-
plication checks if the User’s group can execute a certain transaction on any file.
Then, it is examined whether the User has enough credits (in case of buy and up-
grade operations) or any downloads left available on the file (in case of download
transaction), or whether the User is the owner of the file (in case of edit and remove
transactions). As we can see, the authorization process relies heavily on subject’s
attributes, and we utilize the pre-Authorizations URBAC variant.
Even before a transaction is started, conditions are tested. The application en-
ables the system administrator to apply a very flexible approach to defining condi-
tions. This will be better understood if we analyze the ConditionRule model. The
first field of the model defines the type of transaction that this rule will be appli-
cable to. It is possible to set the value of this attribute to ALL, indicating that the
rule will be applied to any transaction. The construction of the ConditionRule class
results in an ability to define rules of the form ’the value of variable a must be in
the range between b and c’ or ’variable a must contain c’, connected into longer
predicates using logical operators.
Finally, the obligations the user has before exercising the rights on a file in-
clude displaying an advertisement before the download starts. Checking whether
the obligation should be applied depends both on subject’s and object’s attributes:
whether to display an advertisement depends on whether an advertisement has
been assigned to the file. Similarly, some user groups may have the privilege to
omit the advertisement.
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The created application utilizes a wide variety of elements derived from the
concept of URBAC, implemented in both a static and dynamic way. The presented
solution provides a general idea on how the abstract model can be employed in a
real application.
6. Administration tool for access control in information sys-
tems using usage concept
The previous section presents the exemplary application from the point of view
of URBAC elements. That application is manage with the use of URABC ap-
proach. But, of course, we need the administration tool that will helps us to man-
age the logical security, i.e. access control, usage control, of such application, set
of application or whole information system.
To obtain this goal, the administration tool to manage the access control of
information systems from the point of view of security administrator was created.
This tool was based on the URBAC approach - it allows to manage the access con-
trol of an application of an information systems with the use of URBAC concepts.
The security administrator who is responsible for the information system security
obtained a tool that facilitate the management of one of security aspects, namely
the management of access control of users to data stored in a system. He has the
knowledge of general security rules, privileges and constraints that should be re-
spected on the enterprise level. However, the application/system developer who
knows the specifications of information system that need to be realized can also
use the tool to define the access control rules for the application’s elements on the
conception level.
The presented tool is a part of the platform for access control management in
distributed information system based on URBAC approach. The important stage of
platform functionality is the process of role engineering. This stage is based on the
concepts of URABC approach and uses the UML to design the logical model of an
application or a system and uses the XML language to exchange the information
came from different UML diagrams, assuring the independent formalism. The first
stage of the role engineering process is the creation of roles and definition of set
of roles. This stage, presented in section 4, is realized basing on the concepts of
URBAC approach and the UML concepts.
The second purpose of the platform is to make possible the cooperation be-
tween application/system developer and security administrator to realize and inte-
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Figure 7. Administration tool - management of users
grate the presented concepts on global level of access control. The result of such
cooperation should be the validation of activities realized by the developer and
by the administrator to assure the global coherence on access control level in the
information system.
Exemplary views of the administration tool from the security administrator
point of view are presented on the figure 7 and 8. They show the possibility to
manage the access control basing on the URBAC approach. The administrator can
manage the system users, defining the user profiles. He can add new users to the
system, change the names, passwords and define the roles of existing users. While
adding new user, administrator can assign him multiple roles (Fig. 7). There is also
the possibility of deleting some of them from the list.
In another window the security administrator gets the possibility of managing
the roles defined in a system that he obtained in a form of list. This list of roles
can be modified by adding new roles, modifying already existing ones or removing
particular roles (Fig. 8). He can assign the functions to each role to define the role
specification.
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Figure 8. Administration tool - management of roles
7. Conclusion
The traditional access control models are insufficient in distributed, complex
and dynamic information systems, especially to express the policy of usage con-
trol. We need to have the security model to specify the general permissions, inter-
dictions and obligations of an information system and to define the security rules
dependent on application context.
The concepts of presented access control model were used to define the process
of role engineering for creation of security profiles for users of information system.
The paper presented the representation of URBAC model using the UML concepts
and the process of roles production based on URBAC model.
It seems that the URBAC approach can be used to support the security of dy-
namic information systems. The dynamic change of security policy can be trans-
lated by the change of the values of subject attributes or object attributes. The
modification of an attribute can be realized before the information access, during
the information access or at the end of the access.
The discussed approach requires collaboration of the system developer and
the global security administrator since both of them define security elements and
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constraints for the system, though each one on a different level. The issues of their
activities have to be confronted and verified. The confrontation of two viewpoints
consists of the verification that the developer’s work does not cause incoherences in
the global security of the information system through identification of the problems
that may appear between these two levels.
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